In the Sunset District multiple fires are likely to occur following an earthquake, but there is not adequate water pressure to reach them on the westside.
Applying the Lessons from the Los Angeles Fires
Officials Need to Act Now to Prevent a Sunset District Conflagration
• • • • • • • • February 2025 • • • • • • • •
Devastating fires like the ones we saw in Los Angeles could just as easily happen in San Francisco. It doesn’t have to be that way if San Francisco acts with a sense of urgency to apply the lessons already learned from the Los Angeles conflagration.
news/wuerfel.htmlSan Francisco’s Sunset District is not protected by a fire suppression system that includes hydrants and cisterns. The SF Public Utilities Commission (SFPUC) took control of the City’s fire suppression infrastructure in 2010 and finally became concerned about the Sunset situation in 2019. It developed a plan to fight massive fires on the City’s western side, which was scheduled to begin to remedy the problem in 2023, with a target to finish the work in 2039. The initial scope of the plan included the extension of hydrants and installation of cisterns, as well as the use of the Sunset Reservoir, which provides potable drinking water for putting out fires. The plan excludes any mention of using seawater to fight a massive blaze.
Earthquakes give little, if any, warning, and even when they occur, they offer no indication of how long the shaking will last. The recent 3.6 quake just offshore from the San Francisco Zoo woke a lot of residents with a good rattle for a few seconds. The Loma Prieta temblor of 1989 lasted for about 17 seconds, doing major damage in San Francisco. If that epicenter were instead on the San Andreas, just near the entry to the Golden Gate, the City would have had much greater destruction … and fire.
On-shore winds are a given in the Sunset, with only short periods when offshore breezes materialize. Likewise, locals are keenly aware of the looming risks of a massive earthquake hitting San Francisco again, as it did in 1906, causing extensive damage to buildings and infrastructure. The likelihood of ruptured gas lines feeding a fire after a San Andreas quake is very high. Indeed, such breaks are likely to be numerous. That means the densely packed homes west of 19th Ave. could experience as many as a dozen fires simultaneously. In this scenario, adding 20 miles per hour wind off the ocean will be like an enormous bellows pushing a massive fire up the hill along our Pacific coast.
It is not prudent to rely on drinking water from the Sunset Reservoir—quake survivors will need potable water after a major earthquake. Also, water pressure will be low to non-existent if the hydrants and the drinking water pipes are combined to contain the fire. ”
Californians do not need to try to imagine what that wildfire would look like. Simply look at the ample examples of urban wildfires that surround us. Paradise was rapidly and completely destroyed. Pacific Palisades was reduced to rubble in a few hours. Coffee, district of Santa Rosa, was leveled by high-wind fires. Lahaina, Hawaii, next to the ocean, vanished before firefighters could begin to contain the blaze. In the Oakland hills, trees and houses burned as residents tried to flee down narrow roads.
The Los Angeles fires swept through neighborhoods pushed by fierce winds and fueled by dry conditions for vegetation. The wood frame homes in Pacific Palisades and Altadena succumbed to the heat and flaming embers that burned them to the ground. LA County did not have sufficient fire engines or firefighters to fight such a fast-moving catastrophe effectively. Fire hydrants were used to contain the blaze, but the water soon stopped due to a lack of water pressure in the system, and they were widely used in multiple sites. Even aerial dumps of water and retardants were no match to the flames driven by high-force winds. In the aftermath of the disaster in LA, these problems will be detailed, and newer strategies will be planned to prevent any re-occurrence of this awful event.
San Francisco, too, must act to be better prepared to face the risk in the Sunset. Key to building a better plan is to accelerate the plan. It must be in place much sooner. Our City elected officials would be negligent if they allow the current PUC plan to proceed as it is. It is based only on the hope that sometime in the next 15 years, the BIG ONE will not happen. The priority for this project must be increased.
The plan should be revisited and revised to return the responsibility for the fire suppression system to the San Francisco Fire Department. They have the knowledge, experience, and daily firefighting responsibilities to build a reliable, robust, and effective system for the Sunset. Our professional firefighters know what it takes to suppress a blaze and how to manage multiple events at once. They are best suited to know what resources they need in our infrastructure along with the equipment, skills, and personnel to be best prepared for this likelihood.
The water source for dousing several huge fires in the Sunset must be a layered approach. Rely on fire engines and cisterns for initial response. Deploy hose lines, or build sea water pipes across Ocean Beach, to provide unlimited amounts of water to firemen. It is not prudent to rely upon drinking water from the Sunset Reservoir, as quake survivors will need potable water after a major earthquake. Also, water pressure will be low to non-existent if the hydrants and the drinking water pipes are combined to contain the fire. A separate fire suppression system would also minimize the work needed to flush potable water pipes that remain intact through such a disaster.
Clearly, San Francisco’s Fire Department cannot be expected to fight these fires alone. A clear plan for quickly obtaining additional resources outside the City, such as those available in LA, must be in place to handle the crises. The response to the Los Angeles fires was widely supplemented with additional equipment and personnel. Bringing those people and machines needs to happen very quickly to be most effective.
Finally, the construction of the additional cisterns and plumbing and new additional hydrants, guided by SFFD expertise, needs to be planned now. There are previous plans still available for such a need. They must be dusted off and updated with the experience of the Los Angeles fires in mind. Our political leaders must, of necessity, provide proper funding and expedited construction schedules to get this job done in five years.
That’s not impossible. After all, in 1961, President Kennedy committed to putting a man on the moon in 10 years. At that time, almost nothing which made the voyage possible existed at the time of Kennedy’s inauguration. It only took nine years, with political support, funding, planning and hard work. Surely, the City’s leaders can design a proper system to prevent swaths of our City from going up in flames, which can be completed in the next five years.
That investment will guard our beautiful City for generations.
Ted Loewenberg Westside Resident
February 2025
